Abstract: In this Letter we examine the cryptanalysis of a class of block ciphers referred to as substitution-permutation networks or SPNs. Speci cally, we present a novel attack applicable to tree-structured SPNs. Because it uses a known plaintext approach, the attack is preferable to previously outlined chosen plaintext attacks. As well, it is shown that the attack is applicable to networks which are simple extensions of tree-structured SPNs.
The s-th S-box in round r is de ned as a bijective mapping S rs : X rs ! Y rs where X rs = X The cipher is keyed by applying S bits of the key to select each S-box mapping from a set of mappings. A simple example of an SPN is illustrated in Figure 1 .
Tree-structured SPNs or TS-SPNs are a fundamental class of SPNs that were initially introduced by Kam and Davida 3] and subsequently investigated by Ayoub 4] . These networks have the property that, assuming that each S-box output bit is a nondegenerate mapping of the S-box input bits, each ciphertext bit may be represented as a tree function of all plaintext bits. TS-SPNs are of interest because they are the only SPN structure known to provably satisfy the important cryptographic property of completeness. The network of Figure 1 with the last round removed so that there are 3 rounds of substitutions would be an example of a TS-SPN.
In 5], Heys and Tavares, extending the work of Anderson 6] on the cryptanalysis of bit-based tree ciphers, demonstrated the susceptibility of TS-SPNs to a chosen plaintext attack. Subsequently, Millan, Dawson, and O' Connor 7] outlined an improvement in the e ciency of the attack and O' Connor 8] showed that these networks are susceptible to di erential cryptanalysis, also a chosen plaintext attack. The cryptanalysis presented in this Letter is preferable to these attacks because it is a known plaintext attack and is applicable to networks that are constructed by extending TS-SPNs to more rounds. t . The cryptanalyst will attack the cipher by rst determining a subset of the key bits called the target sub-key. For example, de ne the target sub-key to consist of key bits associated with the S-boxes which compose the tree function f 0 t plus the key bit(s) from the last round S-box S Rs . The attack proceeds by obtaining several known plaintext-ciphertext pairs and executing trial encryptions of the known plaintexts for all possible values of the target sub-key. The remaining key bits should be arbitrarily selected in each encryption. When the correct target sub-key is used, the value of bit X (Rs) 1 will be correct in the trial encryption of all plaintexts. Each of the remaining n ? 1 input bits to S Rs will be correct with a probability of 1/2. As a result, the trial ciphertext sub-block Y Rs will be the same as the actual ciphertext sub-block with a probability of 1=2 n?1
. If the wrong sub-key is used, we expect that X (Rs) 1 will be correct only about 1/2 the time. As a result the trial ciphertext sub-block will be the same as the actual ciphertext sub-block with a probability of 1=2 n .
Once the target sub-key is determined, the remaining key bits may be revealed by targeting other tree functions or by exhaustive search. The complexity of the attack (de ned as the number of encryption operations required) is given approximately by N K N P where N P represents the number of known plaintexts needed to distinguish the correct sub-key from incorrect sub-keys and N K represents the number of sub-key trials required.
To determine N P consider a hypothesis test with hypothesis H 0 being that the trial target sub-key is incorrect and hypothesis H 1 being that the trial target sub-key is correct. The probability that the trial ciphertext sub-block is the same as the actual ciphertext sub-block is p 0 = 1=2 n under H 0 and p 1 = 1=2 n?1 under H 1 . Given a trial of N P encryptions, the number of times that the trial and actual ciphertext subblocks are the same follows the binomial distribution but may be approximated by a Gaussian distribution with mean i = N P p i and variance For convenience, we shall assume that the acceptable probability of error in selecting a hypothesis is the same for both H 0 and H 1 . Hence, designing the hypothesis test so that the probability that a hypothesis is incorrectly chosen is given by erfc( ) leads to 0 + 0 = 1 ? 1 where small values for are su cient to provide a suitably small probability of error in the hypothesis test. Consequently, N P is given by (1) Hence, assuming the S-box size to be xed, the number of known plaintexts required in the attack is a constant, regardless of the block size.
Assuming that each S-box in the network is keyed independently of the other S-boxes, the number of sub-key trials required is given by N K 2 S S where S is the number of key bits used per S-box and S is the number of S-boxes that are targeted and is given by Using a meet-in-the-middle approach, the attack outlined in the previous section can also be applied to such extended TS-SPNs. In this case, N P and N K may be determined as before with S now given by S = 2(N=n) " 1=n ? 1=n R=2+1 1 ? 1=n 
